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TELL IT ONLY TO THE JUDGE: DISCLOSURE OF
CLIENT CONFIDENCES UNDER THE ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
BARRY R. VICKREY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In August of 1983 the American Bar Association House of
Delegates1 adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules). 2 The Model Rules replace the Model Code of
*Assistant Prolessot, University ot lNorth Dakota School of Law; B.A., Vanderbilt University,
1971; J.D., Vanderbilt University School of Law, 1977; member of the Professional Conduct
Subcommittee of the Attorney Standards Committee of the North Dakota Supreme Court.
1. The House of Delegates is the policy-making body of the American Bar Association. A.B.A.
CONST. § 6.1. The House of Delegates is composed primarily of officers and former officers delegates
elected by ABA members, and representatives of state and local bar associations, sections, and
divisions, and other lawyers' organizations. See id. S 6.2.
2. The ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards drafted the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. The late Robert J. Kutak of Omaha, Nebraska, chaired the Commission,
which is often referred to as the Kutak Commission.
At the 1977 Midyear Meeting of the ABA House of Delegates, the Dallas Bar Association
proposed the adoption of a resolution calling for a National Symposium on the Code of Professional
Responsibility to be held during the 1979 Annual Meeting in Dallas. [1977] 102 REP. oF A.B.A. 206
(1983). The resolution stated the purpose of the Symposium as follows:
S o that lawyers, judges, professors, law school deans, philosophers, theologians and
other learned disciplines may critically examine the Code in light of its ten year
history, looking at the ethical relationship between the individual attorney and the
world in which he lives and works, with particular emphasis on what is expected of
him by his profession, his clients, opposing counsel and their clients, the courts, the
public at large and others.
Id. at 207. It is not unlikely that the Dallas Bar Association also hoped that the Symposium would
increase attendance at the Dallas meeting.
The resolution was referred to the ABA Board of Governors. Id. at 206. At the 1977 Annual
Meeting, the Board reported that it had created a nine-member special committee "to study further
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Professional Responsibility (Model Code),3 which forms the basis
for the North Dakota Code of Professional Responsibility 4 as the
Association's recommended ethical standards. A committee
appointed jointly by the North Dakota Supreme Court and the
State Bar Association of North Dakota is now considering whether
to recommend adoption of the Model Rules. 5
Client confidentiality was the most controversial issue
involved in the lengthy drafting and debate of the Model Rules. 6
The Model Rules generally expand the protection provided by the
Model Code against disclosure of confidential information. When
the duty to preserve client confidentiality conflicts with the truth-
seeking function of the courts, however, the Model Rules prefer the
enlargement and review of the Code of Professional Responsibility in preparation for the National
Symposium." Id. at 581. In April 1978, the Board transformed the special committee into a
commission by adding two non-lawyers. See [1978] 103 REP. oF A.B.A. 646 (1983). 'The
Commission's 1978 report to the House of Delegates indicated that its mission had expanded beyond
preparation for the National Symposium. The report described the Commission's assignment as
"the evaluation of all facets of legal ethics, both in substantive content and procedural form." Id. at
784. In addition, the Commission reported that it would file an interim report at the 1979 Annual
Meeting and then a final report and recommendation. Id. at 784-85. Thus, the Commission
contemplated a life and a mission much greater than the National Symposium.
The Model Rules adopted by the American Bar Association House of Delegates contain 52
rules. The rules are accompanied by comments that "are intended as guides to interpretation."
Scope, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, at 3 (1983). The House debated and acted on
amendments to Rule 1.5 (pertaining to fees) at the August 1982 Annual Meeting and debated and
acted on amendments to the black letter rules at the February 1983 Midyear Meeting. The House
formally adopted the rules, along with the comments and prefatory sections, at the August 1983
Annual Meeting.
3. The ABA House of Delegates adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model
Code) in 1969. [1969] 94 REP. OF A.B.A. 392 (1970). The Model Code became effective January 1,
1970, and superseded the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics. Preface to MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY at i (1980). Former ABA President (now Justice) Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
recommended the committee that drafted the Model Code. Id.
The Model Code consists of "three separate but interrelated parts: Canons, Ethical
Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules." Id. Preliminary Statement at 1. The Canons are "statements
of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct expected of
lawyers." Id. The Canons form a framework within which the more detailed Disciplinary Rules and
Ethical Considerations are arranged. The Disciplinary Rules are "mandatory in character" and
"state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to
disciplinary action." Id. The Ethical Considerations are purportedly "aspirational in character and
represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive." Id. In fact,
some of the Ethical Considerations are not objectives, but rather, are justifications for related
Disciplinary Rules. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1980) (policy
supporting legal assistance to indigents). Some Ethical Considerations are not aspirational and
actually lower the standard set by a Disciplinary Rule. See id. EC 6-4 (permits lawyer to accept
employment despite lack of competence, provided the lawyer will become competent through study).
4. Under Rule 2 of the North Dakota Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, a lawyer may be
disbarred for "violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility as adopted by the State Bar
Association of North Dakota and approved by the Supreme Court." N.D.R. DISCIPLINARY P. 2(1984). The North Dakota Supreme Court promulgates the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. The
North Dakota Constitution provides that the supreme court has authority "to promulgate rules and
regulations for the admission to practice, conduct, disciplining, and disbarment of attorneys at law."
N.D. CONST. art. VI, S 3. Violation of a provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility could*
also constitute a violation of S 27-14-02 of the North Dakota Century Code. See N.D. CENT. CODE
S 27-14-02 (1974 & Supp. 1983) (causes for suspension or revocation of'certificate of admission to the
bar). The North Dakota Code of Professional Responsibility is identical to the ABA Model Code
with respect to all provisions relevant to this Article.
5. The committee is the Professional Conduct Subcommittee of the Attorney Standards
Committee of the North Dakota Supreme Court. The Professional Conduct Subcommittee includes
members nominated by the President of the State Bar Association of North Dakota.
6. How Will New Ethics Code Affect the Practice qf Law?, NAT'L L..., Feb. 21, 1983, at 3, col. 2.
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interests of the courts to those of the client. Confidential
information receives greater protection under the Model Rules
than under the Model Code, but not if a party uses that protection
to deceive the court.
The controversy surrounding the confidentiality rules is
justified by the importance of the principle. The impact of the
confidentiality provisions of the Model Rules, if adopted, will far
exceed the few cases of discipline that are likely to result from their
violation.7 The lawyer's ability to practice competently and the
image of a lawyer as a respected professional depend on the client's
belief that a lawyer will not reveal confidential information. 8 The
members of the bar should carefully consider the effect of these
provisions on the practice of law in North Dakota.
This Article attempts to assist lawyers in evaluating the
differences between the confidentiality provisions of the Model
Code and those of the Model Rules. 9 First, this Article provides an
overview of the relevant Model Code sections. The Article then
describes the confidentiality provisions of the Model Rules. The
changes that would result from adoption of the Model Rules are
described within this discussion of the provisions of the Model
Rules.
II. CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY UNDER THE MODEL
CODE
A. DUTY TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS
A comparison between the Model Code and the Model Rules
appropriately begins with a description of the present Code's
provisions. Unfortunately, summarizing the Model Code's
confidentiality provisions is not an easy task. In fact, the confusion
created by the Model Code's confidentiality provisions is one of the
principal justifications for the existence of the Model Rules.
Canon 4 of the Model Code states the basic duty of client
confidentiality: "A lawyer should preserve the confidences and
secrets of a client." 10 Ethical Consideration 4-1 explains that this
7. Of the 80 disciplinary complaints fi-led against lawyers in North Dakota in 1982, only two
involved confidentiality. Both were dismissed. N.D. State B. Ass'n Inquiry Committee Annual
Report (1983) (available in University of North Dakota Law School Library).
8 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1980). See infra note 12 for the text
of EC 4-1.
9. This Article does not address confidentiality issues implicated in other areas of the Model
Code and Model Rules, including, for example, conflict of interest and imputed disqualification. See
infra note 88.
10. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980).
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obligation is essential to "[b]oth the fiduciary relationship existing
between lawyer and client and the proper functioning of the legal
system." II This obligation has an impact on both competence and
the public's perception of the profession and related willingness to
use a lawyer's services. 2
The lawyer's obligation to preserve client confidences is set
forth in Disciplinary Rule 4-101.13 The rule also contains key
definitions 4 and four exceptions that permit lawyers to disclose
confidential information. 15 The provisions of DR 4-101 and other
provisions in the Code leave much uncertainty about the lawyer's
proper conduct in many situations.
A significant, but somewhat confusing, aspect of the Model
11.Id. EC 4-1.
12. Id. Ethical Consideration 4-1 provides:
Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper
functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of contidences
and secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him. A client must feel free
to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free to
obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client. A lawyer should be fully
informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the
full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his independent
professional judgment to separate the relevant and important from the irrevelant and
unimportant. The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the
confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full development of facts
essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek early
legal assistance.
Id.
13. Id. DR-4-101(B). Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B) provides:
Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a
third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
Id.
14.Id. DR 4-101(A). provides:
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under
applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the professional
relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.
Id.
15. Id. DR 4-101(C). Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C) provides:
A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but
only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or
required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary
to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend
himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful
conduct.
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Code's treatment is the use of the terms "confidence" and
"secret." Since a lawyer's duty is to preserve both "confidences"
and "secrets," it is important to know the meaning of these terms
of art. "Confidence" means information protected by the attorney-
client privilege,' 6 however that privilege might be defined by
substantive law. 7  "Secret" has a vaguer definition: "other
information gained in the professional relationship that the client
has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be
embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client."'"
Both of these terms present difficult conceptual problems.
"Confidence" is only defined by reference to other law, which may
vary from one jurisdiction to another. "Secret" requires an
attorney to interpret the undefined term "professional
relationship,"'' 9 since information gained outside that relationship
16. See id. DR 4-101(A). See supra note 14 for the full text of DR 4-101(A).
17. See United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928, 938 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978). In
Kelly the court of appeals stated:
In order to invoke the attorney-client privilege the claimant must establish the
following elements:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the
person to whom the communication was made (a) is [the] member of a bar of a court,
or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer;
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his
client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily
either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal
proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the
privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
Id. See also 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 5§ 2290-2329 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
18. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (A) (1980). See supra note 14 for
the full text of DR 4-101(A).
19. See L. PATTERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 2.01, at 2-1
(1982). Professor Patterson notes the difficulty of defining the term professional relationship: "What,
precisely, is the legal nature of the lawyer-client relationship? An attempt to articulate an answer to
this question will reveal the complexities and difficulties inherent in the problem. Perhaps that is why
the question has received so little attention." Id. See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). Kerr-McGee involved the
disqualification of a law firm for conflict of interest. 580 F.2d at 1312. In determining whether an
attorney-client relationship existed to disqualify the firm from representing the plaintiff, the court
stated that "an attorney-client relationship does not arise only. . . when the parties expressly or
impliedly consent to its formation. . . . A professional relationship is not dependent upon the
payment of fees nor. . . upon the execution of a formal contract." Id. at 1317 (citing Dresden v.
Willock, 518 F.2d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 1975); Fort Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe &Johnson,
381 F.2d 261, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968); Udall v. Littell, 366 F.2d 668,
676 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967); Allman v. Winkelman, 106 F.2d 663, 665
(9th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 668 (1940); E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F.Supp. 371,
388 (S.D. Tex. 1969)). The court in Kerr-McGee stated, "The fiduciary relationship existing between
lawyer and client extends to preliminary consultation by a prospective client with a view to retention
of the lawyer, although actual employment does not result." 580 F.2d at 1319. A fiduciary obligation
or an implied professional relationship is created when the lawyer is "in a position to receive
privileged information." Id. at 1319 (citing Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567
F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977)). The court determined that the deciding factor was what the client thought
when he made the disclosure, not what the attorney believed: "The professional relationship for
purposes of the privilege for attorney-client communications 'hinges upon the client's belief that he is
consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his manifested intention to seek professional legal advice.' "
580 F.2d at 1319 (quoting E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON TFE LAW OF EvIDENCE 5 88, at
179 (2d ed. 1972)). The court stated, "A fiduciary relationship may result because of the nature of
the work performed and the circumstances under which confidential infirnmation is divulged." 580
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is not included.20 In addition, the definition of "secret" forces the
client to tell the lawyer not to disclose or the lawyer to determine
that disclosure would be embarrassing or detrimental to the
client. 21
If information clears these definitional hurdles, Disciplinary
Rule 4-101(B) establishes the attorney's basic duty to keep
confidential information inviolate. 22 Specifically, the lawyer "shall
not knowingly" reveal a client's confidence or secret or use the
confidential information to the client's disadvantage. 23 Nor may
the lawyer use the information for the advantage of either the
lawyer or a third person, "unless the client consents after full
disclosure. ''24
The exceptions to the Model Code's confidentiality rule are at
least as important as the rule itself. There are four exceptions that
permit the lawyer to reveal confidential information. 2 It is
important to note that none of these exceptions, standing alone,
requires the lawyer to reveal. If one of the exceptions applies, the
lawyer may reveal a client's confidence.2 6 Any requirement to
reveal a confidence must be found outside the provisions of
Canon 4.
B. DISCLOSURE WITH CLIENT CONSENT
The first exception to the Model Code's confidentiality rule
permits the lawyer to reveal confidential information if the client
has consented after full disclosure. 27 The language of the exception
does not indicate whether the consent must be express or may be
implied. Other language in the Disciplinary Rule and two Ethical
F.2d at 1320.
Ethical Consideration 4-4, if it is deemed explanatory and not aspirational, suggests that the
phrase "gained in the professional relationship" is not a significant limit on the duty of
confidentiality: "This ethical precept, unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the
nature or source of information or the fact that others share the knowledge." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-4 (1980). Ethical Consideration 4-6 also suggests an expansive
reading of "professional relationship" by providing that the lawyer's obligation "continues after the
termination of his employment." Id. EC 4-6. If Ethical Consideration 4-6 is aspirational, however,
one could argue that "professional relationship" as used in Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A) must have a
more restricted meaning that does not protect information obtained after the termination of
employment.
20. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1980). Disciplinary Rule
4-101(A) states that a "secret" refers to "information gained in the professional relationship.
Id. See supra note 14.
21. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1980). See supra note 14.
22. Id. DR 4-101(B). See supra note 13 for the text of DR 4-101(B).
23. Id. DR 4-101(B)(1), (2).
24. Id. DR 4-101(B)(3).
25. Id. DR 4-101(C). See supra note 15 for the text of DR 4-101(C).
26. Id. DR 4-101(C).
27. Id. DR 4-101(C)(1). See supra note 15 forthe full text of DR 4-101(C).
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Considerations, however, suggest that a client impliedly consents
to a lawyer's revealing confidential information to the lawyer's
partners, associates, and clerical employees, 28 and to certain
business-related entities. 2 9
The most difficult issue raised by the first exception, aside
from its silence with regard to implied consent, involves the
requirement of "full disclosure." The Model Code refers to "full
disclosure" in other contexts as well,30 but the term is not defined
in the Code. The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility has interpreted full disclosure to require
the lawyer to consider the sophistication and education of the client
and to assure that the client understands the request to consent and
the option to refuse the request. 31
C. DISCLOSURE WHEN PERMITTED BY OTHER RULE OR
REQUIRED BY LAW OR COURT ORDER
Perhaps the most difficult conceptual problem in the Model
Code is raised by the second exception. 32 This exception provides
that a lawyer may reveal confidential information "when permitted
under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order. "3 The
purpose of the exception is valid: to avoid the Hobson's choice
28. Id. EC 4-2. Ethical Consideration 4-2 provides:
Unless the client otherwise directs, a lawyer may disclose the affairs of his client to
partners or associates of his firm. It is a matter of common knowledge that the normal
operation of a law office exposes confidential professional information to non-lawyer
employees of the office, particularly secretaries and those having access to the files....
Id. See id. DR 4-101(D), which provides: "A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his
employees, associates, and others whose services are utilized by him from disclosing or using
confidences or secrets of a client, except that a lawyer may reveal the information allowed by DR 4-
101(C) through an employee."
29. Id. EC 4-3. Ethical Consideration 4-3 provides:
Unless the client otherwise directs, it is not improper for a lawyer to give limited
information from his files to an outside agency necessary for statistical, bookkeeping,
accounting, data processing, banking, printing, or other legitimate purposes,
provided he exercises due care in the selection of the agency and warns the agency that
the information must be kept confidential.
Id.
30. See id. DR 5-101(A) (a lawyer must have consent of client after full disclosure before
accepting employment if the lawyer's professional judgment will be affected by personal interests); 5-
104(A) (a lawyer may not enter into a business transaction with a client if they have differing interests
in the transaction and the client expects the lawyer to exercise professional judgment on behalf of the
client unless the client consents after full disclosure).
31. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1287 (1974). Formal
and informal opinions are issued by what is currently called the Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility. The Committee has had several names during its existence.
32. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(2) (1980). See supra note 15
for the full text of DR 4-101(C).
33. Id.
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between professional discipline for breach of confidentiality and
incarceration or other punishment for violation of law or for
contempt of court.
The actual effect, however, of this exception is confusing at
best. The confusion becomes apparent when one refers to other
provisions of the Model Code which might trigger the application
of the exception.
While the exception speaks of revelations "permitted by"
Disciplinary Rules or "required" by law or court order,34 logically
the exception would apply when a Disciplinary Rule requires
revealing confidential information. Disciplinary Rules are both
"law" and "court order. ' ' 5 The policy served by allowing
revelation when permitted by a Disciplinary Rule equally justifies
disclosure when required by another rule.
When the American Bar Association adopted the Model Code
in 1969, one provision required a lawyer to disclose confidential
information.3 6 Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) required a lawyer to
reveal a client's "fraud upon a person or tribunal" when the client
refused to rectify the fraud. 37 If, for example, a client's testimony
was inconsistent with confidential information possessed by the
lawyer, the lawyer would be required to disclose the client's perjury
even though that action resulted in revealing confidential
information.
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) was amended in 1974, however,
to provide that the duty to disclose a client's fraud existed "except
when the information is protected as a privileged
communication." ' 38 In 1975 the ABA Standing Committee on
Professional Ethics interpreted the phrase "protected as a
privileged communication" to refer to both confidences and
secrets, as defined by Canon 4.39 The Committee, in effect, read
34. Id.
35. See supra note 4.
36. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1969).
37. As adopted in 1969, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) read:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his
client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or
tribunal.
[1969] 94 REP. OF A.B.A. 779 (1970).
38. The exception was approved as a "housekeeping" amendment at the 1974 Midyear
Meeting of the ABA House of Delegates. [1974] 99 REP. OF A.B.A. 166 (1978).
39. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975). The
Committee reasoned that "[t~he balancing of the lawyer's duty to preserve confidences and to reveal
frauds is best made by interpreting the phrase 'privileged communication' in the 1974 amendment to
DR 7-102(B) as referring to those confidences and secrets that are required to be preserved by DR 4-
101." Id. at 4.
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Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) out of the Code to the extent that it
conflicted with the duty of confidentiality.4 0
One commentary has noted that the second exception to the
duty of confidentiality and the amended and interpreted duty to
reveal a client's fraud, when read together, "present an
unfortunate example of conflicting priorities and unresolved cross-
referencing. "41 The result is a logical circle; but-the end result is
that client confidences must be maintained, even though the
lawyer's silence permits a client to commit perjury with impunity.
One unsuccessful attempt to resolve the ethical issues created
by client perjury is Proposed Standard 4-7.7 of the American Bar
Association Standards for Criminal Justice.4 2  This Standard
provides that a lawyer should "strongly discourage the [criminal]
40. Id. at 3-4. The Committee discussed the relationship between Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)
and confidentiality as follows:
[Ilt is clear that there has long been an accommodation in favor of preserving
confidences either through practice or interpretation. . . . The tradition (which is
backed by substantial policy considerations) that permits a lawyer to assure a client
that information (whether a confidence or a secret) given to him will not be revealed to
third parties is so important that it should take precedence, in all but the most serious
cases, over the duty imposed by DR 7-102(B).
Id.
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B), even before the 1974 amendment, was limited by its language
requiring the lawyer to possess information "clearly establishing" the fraud and requiring that the
fraud be perpetrated by the client "in the course of the representation." See MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1980).
41. A.B. FOUND., ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 176 (1979).
42. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-7.7 (2d ed. 1980) (Tentative Draft
approved Feb. 12, 1979, with the exception of Standard 4-7.7).
Proposed Standard 4-7.7, which was not enacted in 1979 because of its implications for the work
of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, reads:
(a) If the defendant has admitted to defense counsel facts which establish guilt and
counsel's independent investigation established that the admissions are true but the
defendant insists on the right to trial, counsel must strongly discourage the defendant
against taking the witness stand to testify perjuriously.
(b) If, in advance of trial, the defendant insists that he or she will take the stand to
testify perjuriously, the lawyer may withdraw from the case, if that is feasible, seeking
leave of the court if necessary, but the court should not be advised of the lawyer's
reason for seeking to do so.
(c) If withdrawal from the case is not feasible or is not permitted by the court, or if
the situation arises immediately preceding trial or during the trial and the defendant
insists upon testifying perjuriously in his or her own behalf, it is unprofessional
conduct for the lawyer to lend aid to the perjury or use the perjured testimony. Before
the defendant takes the stand in these circumstances, the lawyer should make a record
of the fact that the defendant is taking the stand against the advice of counsel in some
appropriate manner without revealing the fact to the court. The lawyer may identify
the witness as the defendant and may ask appropriate questions of the defendant when
it is believed that the defendant's answers will not be perjurious. As to matters for
which it is believed the defendant will offer perjurious testimony, the lawyer should
seek to avoid direct examination of the defendant in the conventional manner; instead,
the lawyer should ask the defendant if he or she wishes to make any additional
statement concerning the case to the trier or triers of the facts. A lawyer may not later
argue the defendant's known false version of facts to the jury as worthy of belief, and
may not recite or rely upon the false testimony in his or her closing argument.
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defendant against taking the witness stand to testify
perjuriously. " ' 43 If the witness insists on lying, the lawyer is
permitted to withdraw4 4 prior to trial with leave of the court, but
the lawyer may not tell the court why withdrawal is sought. 45 With
respect to withdrawal, the Standard ignores the fact that any judge
qualified to sit on the bench will know the reason for the
withdrawal.
The Standard is particularly misguided in dealing with the
situation in which withdrawal is not possible. According to the
standard, "it is unprofessional conduct for the lawyer to lend aid to
the [client's] perjury or use the perjured testimony." 46 Instead, the
lawyer is to record that the client is testifying against the lawyer's
advice and may ask questions if the answers are likely to be
truthful. 47 When the lawyer believes the client will give a perjurious
answer, however, the lawyer must only permit the client to give a
narrative; the lawyer cannot participate in direct examination. 48 In
addition, the lawyer may not argue the false testimony to the jury
or rely upon it in closing argument. 4 9
Standard 4-7.7 strikes a compromise that fails to achieve any
of the proper objectives of the legal system. The lawyer is not
permitted to reveal expressly the fraud on the court, yet the
lawyer's request to withdraw or his passive role in direct
43. Id.
44. Id. The Model Rule requires a lawyer to withdraw from representation if"he knows or it is
obvious that his continued employment will result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule." MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 (B) (2) (1980). This provision is not applicable, however,
to situations involving Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1), since Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) is not
violated by preserving confidential information.
Disciplinary Rule 2-1 10(B)(2) might be triggered, however, by either Disciplinary Rule 7-
102(A)(3), which provides that "a lawyer shall not. . . conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that
which he is required by law to reveal," or Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(4), which says that "a lawyer
shall not. . . knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence." See id. DR 7-102(A)(3); 7-
102(A)(4). Neither of these provisions contains an exception for privileged communications.
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(3) is vague and should. not be relied upon in a situation that is addressed
more specifically by Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(4). Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(4) speaks more
clearly and specifically about the problem addressed by Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1); Standard 4-
7.7 appears to be an effort to resolve the apparent conflict between these two Disciplinary Rules.
Disciplinary Rule 2-110(C)(1) permits the lawyer to withdraw if the client "personally seeks to
pursue an illegal course of conduct" or "insists that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct that is
illegal or that is prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules." Id. DR 2-110(C)(1). Withdrawal,
whether mandatory or merely discretionary, requires permission of the tribunal. Id. DR 2-1 10(A)(1).
In addition, the lawyer must not withdraw "until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable
prejudice to the rights of the client." Id. DR 2-1 10(A)(2.).
45. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE Standard 4-7.7(b) (2d ed. 1980).
46. Id. Standard 4 -7.7(c).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. One court has held that questioning a defendant's witness in a manner consistent with
Standard 4-7.7 denies the defendant effective assistance of counsel. See State v. Robinson, 290 N.C.
56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976). The Robinson court reasoned that "this procedure could hardly have
failed to convey to the jury the impression that the defendant's counsel attached little significance or
credibility to the testimony of the witness, or that the defendant and his counsel were at odds." 224
S.E.2d at 180.
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examination are likely to alert the judge and jury that something is
amiss. Although the lawyer appears to maintain the client's
confidences, the lawyer's actions may convince the judge or jury
that the lawyer possesses damaging confidential information. In
order to avoid making the difficult choice of one ethical principle
over another, Standard 4-7.7 adopts an amoral approach that
sacrifices the interests of the defendant, the lawyer, and the court.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has recognized the
confusion resulting from the conflicting duties of maintaining
confidentiality and preventing fraud by the client. In In re Malloy50
the Grievance Committee of the State Bar Association of North
Dakota sought disciplinary action against a lawyer who chose to
protect a client's confidential information rather than disclose the
client's unexpected perjury at a deposition. 51 The disciplinary
action charged that the lawyer had violated Disciplinary Rule 7-
102(B)(1). 52 The court, noting that the lawyer "was faced with [a]
dilemma caused by conflicting duties," ' 53 held that discipline was
not appropriate. 54
The Malloy court announced a prospective rule requiring the
The lawyer's duty to the court under the Model Code is clearer when the suggested perjurer is a
witness other than the defendant, which was the case in Robinson. Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(2)
requires the lawyer to reveal a fraud upon the tribunal committed by a person other than the client,
and this provision does not have an exception for privileged communications. MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(2) (1980). If the defendant was suborning perjury by the
witness in Robinson, disclosure of the fraud would be embarrassing or detrimental to the defendant
and thus would constitute a disclosure of confidential information. It should be noted that
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(2), by its plain language, applies only to frauds after they have been
committed. See id. The lawyer in Robinson disclosed the suspected fraud before it occurred. 224
S.E.2d at 175.
The Robinson court commended the lawyer for disclosing the suspected perjury. It reasoned that,
"clearly, the client has no right to insist that counsel assist him by presenting in evidence testimony
which counsel knows, or reasonably believes, constitutes perjury." Id. at 179. The Robinson court's
resolution of the dilemma was neither that the lawyer withhold the perjury nor that he participate in
sham representation. Instead, the Robinson court would permit the lawyer to withdraw and require
the defendant to proceed without counsel. Id. at 180.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held, however, that a lawyer's motion to
withdraw when surprised by perjury during examination of the client in a trial before a judge without
a jury denies the defendant a fair trial. Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978). The
Lowery court endorsed Standard 4-7.7 as a preferable alternative, which "cannot be said to constitute
denial of fair trial." Id. at 731.
The Appellate Court of Illinois has specifically held that a lawyer's actions consistent with
Standard 4-7.7 do not deny the defendant effective assistance of counsel. People v. Lowery, 52 Ill.
App. 3d 44, 366 N.E.2d 155 (1977). See also State v. Fosnight, No. 55, 258 (Kan. Mar. 24, 1980).
The Illinois court in People v. Lowery observed that the defendant in Robinson assumed questioning of
the witness when the defense counsel attempted to restrict the testimony to a narrative. 52 11. App.
3d at 49, 366 N.E.2d at 159. The Illinois court thought that this "shifting of the advocatory function
from attorney to client in the presence of the jury" distinguished Robinson from its case, in which the
lawyer "did undertake to question the witness, albeit in narrative form, and no one else assumed
defense counsel's role as an advocate." Id.
50. 248 N.W.2d 43 (N.D. 1976).
51. In re Malloy, 248 N.W.2d 43, 44-46 (N.D. 1976).
52. Id. at 44. The lawyer was not charged with a violation of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(6),
relating to creation or preservation of false evidence, or Disciplinary Rule 2-110(1), relating to
mandatory withdrawal from employment. Id. at 45.
53. Id. at 45.
54. Id. at 47.
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lawyer to withdraw when the client refuses to disclose the perjury. 55
The prospective rule does not require the lawyer to disclose the
fraud upon withdrawal. 56
The Malloy case is particularly noteworthy because it involved
conduct that occurred before the "privileged communication"
exception to Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) was adopted. 57 The
exception had been adopted between the time of Malloy's
challenged conduct and the decision of the court. 58 The court
observed that the "gravity of the dilemma is emphasized" by the
recent amendment. 59 The court correctly perceived that the
amendment was adopted to resolve an irreconcilable conflict
between the duty of confidentiality and the duty to disclose fraud
upon the court. Adoption of the "privileged communication"
exception to Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) resolved the dilemma in
favor of confidentiality.
Thus, the provision allowing disclosure of confidential
information "when permitted under Disciplinary Rules" seems to
be of little effect. Even when revelation might be required under
another Disciplinary Rule, that rule has been amended and
interpreted to give the highest priority to preserving confidences.
The second exception to Disciplinary Rule 4-101
provides another ground for revelation: "when. . . required by law
or court order. "60 Given the possible consequence of not disclosing
confidential information in these circumstances, the significance of
this portion of the exception is clear.
55. Id. at 46. Accord ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1314
(1975). The Malloy court relied on the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court in In re A, 276 Or. 225,
554 P.2d 479 (1976). The court in Malloy stated:
In a case somewhat similar to the present one, the Oregon Supreme Court
concluded that an attorney should urge his client to make a disclosure, and if the client
refuses, the attorney should have nothing further to do with him but that he need not
disclose the fraud to the court. The court then held that no reprimand would be made,
since withdrawal was not specifically required, but that in the future an attorney
whose client refuses to disclose perjury must withdraw from the case.... We agree.
248 N.W.2d at 45-46 (citation omitted). The Oregon Supreme Court noted that the lawyer "was not
required to withdraw under DR 2-11O(B)(2)." In reA, 554 P.2d at 486 (emphasis in original). The
requirement to withdraw was based on an Oregon State Bar ethics opinion requiring withdrawal,
which was issued subsequent to the conduct in question. 554 P.2d at 487. The Oregon court noted
that "it is not clear whether this policy [of mandatory withdrawal] reflects the present position of the
American Bar Association." Id.
56, Malloy, 248 N.W.2d at 45. Accord ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Op. 1314 (1975). The Oregon Supreme Court in In reA explained that the exception to Dis-
ciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1), as interpreted by ABA Formal Opinion 341, meant that the lawyer was
not required to reveal the confidential information. 554 P.2d at 486.
57. See Malloy, 248 N.W.2d at 45. The court noted that "DR 7-102(B)(1) has been amended
since the events giving rise to this proceeding occurred." Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (C) (2) (1980). See supra note 15
for the full text of DR 4-101(C).
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If the exception permits disclosure and other law or a court
order requires it, apparently the lawyer would be required to
disclose confidential information. One court appears to have
adopted this position, reading together this exception and the
prohibition in Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(3) against concealing or
knowingly failing to disclose that which the lawyer is required by
law to reveal. 61
A famous New York case, People v. Belge, 62 reached the
opposite result when the duty of confidentiality conflicted with a
state statute that mandated disclosure of certain information. 63
Belge's client, who was accused of murder, confessed to Belge that
he had committed three other murders.64 As a result of this
information, Belge discovered the dead bodies of two of his client's
other victims. 65 Although there was great family and public
concern over the whereabouts of the missing persons whom Belge
knew to be dead, he did not disclose the existence of the dead bodies
to authorities. 66 Instead, he chose to protect the confidential
information that might have implicated his client in the other
murders. 67
The grand jury indicted Belge for violating two public health
statutes; one required that any body be given a decent burial and
the other that the death of any person who died without medical
61. In re Kerr, 86 Wash. 2d 655, 548 P.2d 297 (1976) (failure to produce subpoenaed affidavits).
The court's citation of Disciplinary Rules 7-102(A) (3) and 4-101 (C) (2) are in a footnote responding
to the lawyer's "excuse" that the affidavits were protected by the attorney-client privilege. 548 P.2d
at 301 n.2. These provisions were not listed by the court as being the basis for the discipline. Id. at
298-99. Instead, the court found that the lawyer attempted to suborn perjury and thus:
violate[d] the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
DR 1-102 (Misconduct),
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or mis-
representation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law.
Id.
62. 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga County Ct. 1975), aff'd, 50 A.D.2d 1088,
376 N.Y.S.2d 771, aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976).
63. People v. Beige, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga County Ct. 1975), aff'd, 50
A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771, aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60,359 N.E.2d 377, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976).
64. People v. Beige, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
65. Slayer's 2 Lawyers Kept Secret of2 More Killings, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1974, at 1, col. 2. The
victims whose bodies Beige found were a 20-year-old woman and a 16-year-old high school girl. Id.
Belge was indicted for failing to report one of the dead bodies. 372 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
66. Slayer's 2 Lawyers Kept Secret of2 More Killings, N.Y. Times,June 20, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
67. The father of one of the victims whose death was unofficially linked to Belge's client visited
Beige but Beige did not disclose his knowledge of the body. " 'The information was so privileged - I
was bound by my lawyers' oath to keep it confidential after I found the bodies,' said Francis Beige."
Id.
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assistance be reported. 68 The trial court acquitted Belge after
weighing the "importance of the general privilege of confidentiality
in the performance of the defendant's duties as an attorney, against
the inroads on such a privilege, on the fair administration of
criminal justice as well as the heart tearing that went on in the
victim's family by reason of their uncertainty .... ,,69
The intermediate appellate court affirmed the acquittal,
commenting that "the [attorney-client] privilege effectively
shielded the defendant-attorney .... ",70 The court observed "that
the privilege is not all-encompassing and that in a given case there
may be conflicting considerations." ' 71  The observation seems
hollow, however, since confidentiality prevails over substantial
conflicting considerations recognized by the court, including the
obligation to "observe basic human standards of decency, having
due regard to the need that the legal system accord justice to the
interests of society and its individual members." 72
At the conclusion of all the proceedings in the Belge case, the
Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York State Bar
Association ruled that Belge's decision was mandated by the Code
of Professional Responsibility. 73 According to the Committee, the
lawyer "was under an injunction not to disclose to the authorities
his knowledge of the two prior murders, and was duty-bound not to
reveal to the authorities the location of the bodies. 74
68. The grand jury indicted Beige for violating 'S 4200(1) and 4143 of the New York Public
Health Law. Id. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 5§ 4200(1) (requiring decent burial); 4143 (duty to give
notice of a death to county coroner or medical examiner) (McKinney 1977). 372 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
69. 372 N.Y.S.2d at 802. The trial judge noted:
A trial is in part a search for truth, but it is only partly a search for truth. The mantle
of innocence is flung over the defendant to such an extent that he is safeguarded by
rules of evidence which frequently keep out absolute truth, much to the chagrin of
juries.
372 N.Y.S.2d at 801. The judge also commented on the effect of confidentiality on lawyer
competence:
The effectiveness of counsel is only as great as the confidentiality of its [sic] client-
attorney relationship. If the lawyer cannot get all the facts about the case, he can only
give his client half of a defense. This, of necessity, involves the client telling his
attorney everything remotely connected with the crime.
Id. Despite these comments justifying confidentiality, the trial judge suggested the case would have
been much more difficult if the grand jury had returned an indictment based on obstruction ofjustice
rather than "the trivia of a pseudo-criminal statute." 372 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
70. People v. Beige, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771, 771 (1975).
71. Id. at 772.
72. Id.
73. N.Y. State B. Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 479 (1978).
74. Id. at 5. The Committee explained:
The lawyer's knowledge with respect to the location of the bodies was obtained solely
from the client in confidence and in secret. Without the client's revelation in secret and
in confidence, he would not have been in a position to assist the authorities in this
274
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Thus, the second exception to the duty of confidentiality fails
to provide clear guidance in the situation it seeks to address. 75
While the exception indicates that there are circumstances in which
the lawyer may reveal confidential information because other
authority permits or requires disclosure, it is not clear when the
exception would apply.
Perhaps the exception's purpose is accomplished by virtue of
its vagueness. Just as the Malloy court held that a lawyer could not
be disciplined for preserving confidences when faced with the
conflicting duties under the Code, 76 it appears unlikely that a
lawyer would be disciplined for a good faith reliance on this
exception when other authority permitted or required disclosure.
Perhaps this is the rare situation in which the lawyer can do no
wrong. But if this is the case, is the lawyer misleading a client when
the lawyer represents that the client's information will be kept
confidential? Must a lawyer disclose to the client that other
authority may permit or require the lawyer to disclose confidential
information?
D. DISCLOSURE TO PREVENT FUTURE CRIMES
The third exception to the Model Code's confidentiality rule
permits the lawyer to reveal the client's "intention... to commit a
crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.' 77 The
purpose of this exception is not to protect the lawyer since it is
unlikely that a court will hold a lawyer liable to the victim if the
client carries out a threatened crime. 78 The theory behind the
exception is that neither the evidentiary privilege for confidential
information 79 nor the lawyer's fiduciary duty to the client applies to
regard. Thus, his personal -knowledge is a link solidly welded to the chain of privileged
communications and, without the client's express permission, must not be disclosed.
The relationship between lawyer and client is in many respects like that between priest
and penitent. Both lawyer and priest are bound by the bond of silence.
Id.
75. See Slayer's 2 Lawyers Kept Secret 2 More Killings, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1974, at 1, col. 2. The
New York Times article included this apt comment: "According to a number of legal authorities in
New York City, the issue of what a lawyer should do when apprised by his client of criminal action is
a gray area." Id.
76. See In re Malloy, 248 N.W.2d 43, 45-47 (N.D. 1976).
77. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAl. R ESPONSIBIITY DR 4-101(C) (3) (1980). See supra note 15 fir
the full text of DR 4-101(C).
78. But see McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, __, 403 A.2d 500, 513 (1979). Dictum
in McIntosh suggests language concerning a psychiatrist finding it necessary to reveal confidential
infortiiatin to protect a patient or the community from imminent danger "could well apply.., even
to lawyers." 403 A.2d at 513. Cf. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of California. 17 Cal, 3d 425, 551
P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (psychotherapist subject to tort liability for failing to reveal
confidential information to protect third Person fron patient).
79. E.g., United States v. Bartlett, 449 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 932
(1972). The theory is ably discussed in State v. Phelps, an Oregon case. The court in Phelps explained:
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criminal conduct. 8 0
The third exception is not without its difficulties. If the word
"crime" includes frauds, this exception raises the same problems
as the second exception when a client commits perjury or another
fraud. In addition, the distinction between past and future crimes
provides no guidance when the client's wrongdoing is continuous.
Finally, the exception makes no distinction with respect to the
gravity of the crime. The exception permits the disclosure of any
future crime, though it may be more appropriate to prohibit
disclosure of less serious misconduct and mandate the disclosure of
very serious crimes.
The "future crime" exception is limited in two important
respects. First, the language of the exception restricts disclosure to
that information which is "necessary" to prevent the crime. 81
Presumably, this requires the lawyer to make the most limited
disclosure that will prevent the crime.
Second, language in an ABA ethics opinion8 2 and an Ethical
Consideration 83 discourage the lawyer from determining that the
client intends to commit a crime. An ABA opinion interpreting the
lawyer's duty of truthfulness under the 1908 Canons when
representing a client before the Internal Revenue Service
concluded that the lawyer was not required to disclose adverse
information unless "the facts in the attorney's possession indicate
beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime will be committed. "84
Assuming that the lawyer is likely to resolve doubts in favor of the
client, 5 the "reasonable doubt" standard will rarely be met.
Because the exception merely permits and does not require
In order that the rule [of privilege] may apply there must be both professional
confidence and professional employment, but if the client has a criminal object in view
in his communications with his solicitor [i.e., lawyer] one of these elements must
necessarily be absent. The client must either conspire with his solicitor or deceive him.
If his criminal object is avowed, the client does not consult his adviser professionally,
because it cannot be the solicitor's business to further any criminal object. If the client
does not avow his object, he reposes no confidence, for the state of facts, which is the
foundation of the supposed confidence, does not exist. The solicitor's advice is
obtained by a fraud.
State v. Phelps, 545 P.2d 901, 904 (1976) (quoting Queen v. Cox, 14 Q.B.D. 153, 168 (1884)).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 comment f (1958). An agent may reveal
information confidentially acquired in the course of the agency to protect a superior interest of the
agent or a third person. If the information is to the effect that the principal is committing or is about
to commit a crime, the agent is under no duty not to reveal. An attorney employed to represent a
client in a criminal proceeding has no duty, however, to reveal that the client has confessed to a past
crime. Id.
81. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (3) (1980). See supra note 15
for the text of DR 4-101(C)(3).
82. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965).
83. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-6 (1980).
84. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965).
85. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-6 (1981). Ethical Consideration 7-
6 deals specifically with the development of evidence relevant to the client's state of mind when
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disclosure, the lawyer is likely to reveal a future crime only when
compelled to do so by personal ethical norms.
E. DISCLOSURE TO COLLECT A FEE OR IN SELF-DEFENSE
The fourth and final exception permits a lawyer to disclose
confidential information to establish or collect a fee or to defend
against an accusation of wrongful conduct.8 6 While the protective
purpose of this provision is apparent and probably justified, it
creates obvious image problems for the legal profession.
Professional ethics seem to give way to financial self-interest, but
the alternative is to permit a client to abuse the lawyer's loyalty.
III. CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY UNDER THE MODEL
RULES
This section will discuss the major provisions of the Model
Rules that relate to client confidentiality. The treatment of
confidentiality under the Model Rules differs significantly in
several respects from the Model Code, and these changes and other
related proposals were the most controversial issues in the ABA's
deliberation on the Model Rules. 87 Within the discussion of each
provision of the Model Rules, this section will compare the
approach of the Rules to that of the Model Code.
Three rules are of primary importance in understanding the
duty of confidentiality under the Model Rules. 88  Rule 1.6
intent, motive, or desires may affect the legal consequences attached to the client's conduct. It
indicates that the lawyer should resolve reasonable doubts in this situation in favor of the client.
While the Ethical Consideration does not relate specifically to the client's intent to commit a future
crime, it states a general principle for resolving doubts that are logically applicable to the situation.
The principle of resolving doubts in favor of the client is consistent with the existence of a trust
relationship between the lawyer and the client and with zealous advocacy on behalf of the client.
86. Id. DR 4-101(C) (4). See supra note 15 for the full text of DR 4-101(C). Accusations of
wrongful conduct may arise in legal malpractice or other civil actions, criminal actions aimed at the
lawyer, motions for disqualification for conflict of interest, motions for new trial, appeals of criminal
convictions, and habeas corpus or other proceedings seeking post conviction relief. See generally
LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 55:703 to 55:705 (1984).
87. See How Will New Ethics Code Affect the Practice of Law?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 21, 1983, at 3, col.
2. Accord ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES No. 400, at 11 (June 30, 1982) ("Nothing in the final draft produced more comment than
the three Rules addressing client-lawyer confidentiality."). When the ABA House of Delegates
formally adopted the Model Rules at the August 1983 Annual Meeting, only two state bar
associations indicated that their delegations would not vote for adoption. Both states, Florida and
California, specifically expressed opposition to the adopted rules relating to confidentiality, but for
different and conflicting reasons.
88. Other provisions of the Model Rules relate to confidentiality but do not define the duty.
Rules 2.3, 8.1, and 8.3 contain specific exceptions protecting confidential information. See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 2.3 (permitting a lawyer to evaluate a matter for use by third
persons); 8.1(b) (prohibiting knowing tailure to disclose int6 iration in bar admission and
disciplinary matters); 8.3 (1983) (requiring a lawyer to report misconduct by another lawyer or judge
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establishes the basic duty8 9 and two key exceptions. 90 Rule 3.3 deals
with the duty of candor to a tribunal and the conflict between that
duty and client confidentiality. 91 Rule 4.1 treats the obligation of
truthfulness to others and its relationship to confidentiality. 9
in certain situations). The comments to Rule 1.10 and Rule 2.2 note the significance of
confidentiality in the application of these rules. See id. Rules 1.10 comment (general rule of imputed
disqualification); 2.2 comment (authorizing the lawyer to act as an intermediary).
Rule 1.13, which deals with representation of corporate and other organizational clients,
contains a confidentiality exception by implication. As proposed by the Commission on Evaluation
of Professional Standards, Rule 1.13 would have permitted disclosure of information otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6, the basic confidentiality rule, in certain situations in which the actions of the
organization's highest authority were likely to injure the organization. ABA AMENDMENTS TO
PROPOSED MODEL Rui.ES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH SYNOPSIS 40 (Feb. 7-9, 1983) (Proposed
Rule 1.13(c)). After lengthy debate, the House of Delegates approved an amendment offered by the
American College of Trial Lawyers that deleted the disclosure provision and substituted the
exclusive remedy of withdrawal under Rule 1.16. See ABA House of Delegates, Daily Journal (Feb.
7-9, 1983); ABA AMENDMENTS TO PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH
SYNOPSIS (S) 44-3-44-3.1 (Feb. 7-9, 1983). The House adopted the amendment by a vote of 188 to
135.
89. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6. Rule 1.6(a) provides: "A lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after
consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b)." Id.
90. Id. Rule 1.6(b). Rule 1.6(b) provides:
A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between
the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond
to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
Id.
91. Id. Rule 3.3. Rule 3.3 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) Fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
(3) Fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not
disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(4) Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered
material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures.
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding,
and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by
Rule 1.6.
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts
known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision,
whether or not the facts are adverse.
Id.
92. Id. Rule 4.1. Rule 4.1 provides:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) Fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited
by Rule 1.6.
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A. DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY - RULE 1.6
Rule 1.6 establishes the basic duty of client confidentiality. 93
The comment to the rule forcefully indicates the significance of the
rule. When another provision of law conflicts with Rule 1.6, there
is a presumption that Rule 1.6 takes priority. 94
Rule 1.6, as approved by the ABA House of Delegates, differs
substantially from the proposal of the Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards. 95  Two exceptions proposed by the
Commission were rejected entirely. The first would have permitted
disclosure to rectify the consequences of a criminal or fraudulent
act when the client had used the lawyer's services to further the
act. 96 The second would have preserved the Model Code's
93. Id. Rule 1.6. See supra notes 89-90 for the text of Rule 1.6.
94. Id. Rule 1.6 comment Disclosure Otherwise Required or Authorized. This comment to Rule 1.6
provides:
The Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or require a
lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation .... In addition to these
provisionss a lawyer may be obligated or permitted by other provisions of law to give
information about a client. Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a
matter of interpretation beyond the scope of these Rules, but a presumption should
exist against such a supersession.
Id. The general counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commission has objected to this presumption
favoring confidentiality. [I Current Reports] LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(ABA/BNA) at 71-72. (Feb. 22, 1984).
95. The Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards proposed the following rule at the
February 1983 Midyear Meeting:
Rule 1.6 Confidentiality oflinformation
Model Rule Text:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph
(b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer believes
necessary:
(1) To prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the
lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, or in
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another;
(2) To rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the
furtherance of which the lawyer's services had been used;
(3) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, or to establish a defense to a criminal charge, civil
claim or disciplinary complaint against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the
client was involved; or
(4) To comply with other law.
ABA AMENDMENTS TO PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH SYNOPSIS 13 (Feb.
7-9, 1983) The final version of Rule 1.6 resulted from an amendment proposed by the American
College of Trial Lawyers. See ABA House of Delegates, Daily Journal (Feb. 7-9, 1983); ABA
AMENDMENTS TO PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH SYNOPSIS (S) 19-2 (Feb.
7-9, 1983). The House adopted the amendment by a vote of 207 to 129. LAWYER'S MANUAL ON
PROFESSIONAl. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 55:105 (1984). The House debated but rejected two minor
amendments. SeeABA House of Delegates, DailyJournal (Feb. 7-9, 1983).
96. The Commission's proposal would have modified the principle contained in Disciplinary
Rule 7-102(B) (1) of the Model Code. See ABA COMM. ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS,
MODEL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. 41 (Proposed Final Draft 1981). The Commission
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exception that permits disclosure to comply with law or court
order.97 Other differences between the Model Rules and the Model
Code are described within the following discussion of Rule 1.6 as
approved by the House of Delegates.
1. Scope of Coverage
The scope of information covered by the duty of
confidentiality is greater under Rule 1.6 than under the Model
Code. 98 Under Rule 1.6 the duty applies to all "information
relating to representation of a client. "99 The scope of protection
under the Model Code is limited in a number of ways as compared
to the broad language of Rule 1.6.
First, the Model Code protects information labeled
"confidences" only to the extent that applicable law would apply
the attorney-client privilege to the information. 100 The comment to
Rule 1.6 indicates that "relating to the representation" includes
but extends beyond the attorney-client privilege to "all information
relating to the representation, whatever its source. '"101 The
language in the comment to Rule 1.6 reflects a principle expressed
in an Ethical Consideration of the Model Code. 10 2 If the language
of the Ethical Consideration is merely aspirational, the scope of the
duty under the Model Code is limited to the more restricted
language in the Disciplinary Rules. 03 The comment to Rule 1.6,
on the other hand, appears to be a logical and enforceable
interpretation of the Rule's broad language.
asserted that this provision would make the disclosure of the fraud optional rather than mandatory.
Id. In those states that had adopted the "privileged communication" exception to Disciplinary Rule
7-102(B) (1), the Commission's proposal would have made disclosure of confidential information
permissible when it is now prohibited. The Commission noted that a majority of the states had not
adopted the "privileged communication" exception. Id. at 42.
97. This provision "was redundant insofar as a lawyer's ethical obligations are not intended to
usurp his legal duties." ABA, LEGAL BACKGROUND TO THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 73 (Tentative Draft, January 1984); see Scope, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAl CONDUCT at
4 ("The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role.") The Model Code
provision is also inconsistent with the presumption under the Model Rules that Rule 1.6 is not
superseded by other law. See id. Rule 1.6 comment Disclosures Otherwise Required orAuthorized. See supra
note 94 for the text of this comment to Rule 1.6.
98. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980) with MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).
99. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1983). See supra note 89 for the text of
Rule 1.6(a).
100. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1980). See supra note 14
for the definition of "confidence" and supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of
information protected by the attorney-client privilege.
101. MODEL R ULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment at 24 (1983).
102. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-4 (1980). Ethical Consideration 4-4
states that the attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard
the confidences and secrets of the client. The ethical obligation, unlike the evidentiary privilege,
exists without regard for the nature or source of ihe information. Id.
103. See id. DR 4-101(A). See supra note 14 for the text ofDR 4-101(A).
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Of course, the Model Code protects "secrets" as well as
"confidences. ' 10 4 But the scope of the coverage for "secrets" is
also limited.
A "secret" is limited temporally to information "gained in the
professional relationship." 0 5 This limitation produces the difficult
problem of determining when the professional relationship
begins. 10 6 However a court resolves the issue of when the
professional relationship begins, the language "gained in the
relationship" is highly unlikely to be as inclusive as "relating to the
representation." When the "representation" begins is not an issue
under the Model Rules, since the Rule "imposes confidentiality on
information relating to the representation even if it is acquired
before or after the relationship existed. "107 The only
determinations necessary to trigger the Rule's protection are that
the representation exists and that the information is related to that
representation. 108
The definition of "secret" in the Model Code is also limited
by the action of the client in requesting nondisclosure or the
judgment of the lawyer that disclosure would be embarrassing or
detrimental to the client.109  The phrase "relating to the
representation" requires no action by the client in identifying
confidential information. 110 The lawyer's determination that the
information relates to the representation is much less subjective
than whether disclosure would be embarrassing or detrimental to
the client.
The threshold question in applying the duty of confidentiality
is whether the particular information is covered. The Model
Rules resolve this issue in a manner that far surpasses the Model
Code in preserving client confidentiality. The general language of
Rule 1.6 provides not only greater breadth of coverage but also
more clarity, since it avoids the confusion embodied in the
definitions of" confidence" and "secret."111
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See supra note 19 for a discussion of the difficulty in determining when the professional
relationship begins.
107. Code Comparison, MODEL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONUUCT Rule 1.6 (1983). Although the
House of Delegates adopted the Model Rules, the Code Comparison was never considered for
adoption. LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 01: 101 (ABA/BNA) (1984).
108. See id. Rule 1.6(a). See supra note 89 for the text of Rule 1.6(a).
109. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1981). See supra note 14 for
the definition of "secret" and supra note 21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the definition.
110. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1983). See supra note 89 for the
text of Rule 1.6(a).
111. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1980) (requires
attorney to preserve client's confidences or secrets) with MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(a) (1983) (requires attorney to preserve any information relating to the representation of the
client).
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2. Disclosure with Client Consent
Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules permits disclosure of confidential
information with the client's consent, as does the Model Code. 112
The treatment in the Model Rules, however, does result in two
significant changes.
First, Rule 1.6 explicitly permits implied consent to disclosure
of confidential information. 113 Although certain language in the
Model Code appears to assume that the client impliedly consents to
disclosure to a lawyer's partners, associates, clerical employees,1 4
and business-related entities,1 5 the language of the Disciplinary
Rules does not explicitly authorize implied consent. 116 Rule 1.6
recognizes the practical reality of implied consent;" 7 the comment
to Rule 1.6 notes situations in litigation and negotiation in which
implied consent is necessary.I" In addition, the comment endorses
implied consent to disclose information to other lawyers in the
firm. 1 9 The comment is silent, however, on disclosure to clerical
employees and business-related entities, but presumably, implied
consent to these disclosures is consistent with the language of the
Rule. 120
Second, Rule 1.6 requires "consultation" prior to express
consent, while the Model Code requires "full disclosure.' 2 1 The
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards included this
change in a late draft of the Model Rules without explanation.122
112. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1983) (permits disclosure of
information when the client consents after consultation). Accord MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (1) (1981) (lawyer may reveal confidences or secrets with the consent of
client after full disclosure).
113. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1983) (attorney may disclose
information that is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation).
114. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-2 (1980). See supra note 28 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Ethical Consideration 4-2 and implied consent.
115. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-3. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Ethical Consideration 4-3 and implied consent.
116. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(D) (1980). See supra note 28
for the text of DR 4-101(D).
117. A decade ago, the Canadian Bar Association explicitly authorized implied consent:
"Confidential information may be divulged with the express authority of the client or clients
concerned, and, in some situations, the authority of the client to divulge may be implied." CANADIAN
BAR Ass'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, ch. IV comment 9 (1974). Pleadings and other
litigation documents are mentioned as examples of implied consent, in addition to disclosure to
partners, associates, and nonlegal staff. Id.
118. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment, Authorized Disclosures
(1983) (in litigation a lawyer may disclose information by admitting a fact that cannot be disputed or
in negotiation make a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion).
119. Id. (lawyers in a firm may disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm
unless the client instructs the attorney that the information is to be confined to specified lawyers).
120. See id. Rule 1.6. Disclosure to clerical employees and business-related entities is necessary
"to carry out the representation." See id.
121. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(1) (1980) (lawyer
may disclose if client consents after full disclosure) with MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(a) (1983) (lawyer may disclose if client consents after consultation).
122. Compare ABA COMM. ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF
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The only apparent benefit is to avoid the use of the same word for
the "disclosure" to another of confidential information and the
"disclosure" to the client of information necessary for a valid
consent. Its drawback is that existing interpretations of "full
disclosure"' 12 3 are lost in the substitution of the undefined word
"consultation." If states adopt the Model Rules with the word
"consultation, " courts or other interpreting entities may choose to
resolve the issue by treating "full disclosure" and "consultation"
as synonymous, applying the existing interpretations of the former
to the latter. This would be consistent with the action of the
Commission, which apparently saw no difference in the terms. 124
3. Disclosure to Prevent Future Crime
Rule 1.6 maintains the controversial exception that permits
disclosure of confidential information to prevent a future crime.12 5
Only certain types of crime trigger the exception, however, 26 and
the exception differs in other ways from the similar provision in the
Model Code. 127 As reflected in the debate in the ABA House of
Delegates, opinion varies greatly on the merit of specific aspects of
this exception. 28 This provision of Rule 1.6 is likely to produce
extensive discussion as states consider adoption of the Model
Rules.
The Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) at 37 (Proposed Final Draft 1981) (requiring "disclosure") with
ABA COMM. ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES No.
400 Rule 1.6(a), App. A at 22 (June 30, 1982) in 1 ABA MATERIALS ON MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (August 1982) (requiring "consultation"). "Consultation" is defined as
"communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the
significance of the matter in question." Terminology, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT at 7
(1983).
123. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interpretation of"full
disclosure.''
124. The definition of "disclosure" employed by the Commission was almost identical to the
definition of "consultation" in the adopted Model Rules. The Commission defined "disclosure" as
"communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the person to whom the disclosure is
made to appreciate the significance of the matter in question." ABA COMM. ON EVALUATION OF
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 5 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
See supra note 122 for the definition of"consultation." Even before the change from "disclosure" to
"consultation," the Commission had dropped the modifier "full" used with "disclosure" in the
Model Code. Compare ABA COMM. ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) at 37 (Proposed Final Draft 1981) with MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (1) (1980).
125. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(l) (1983). See supra note 90 for
the text of Rule 1.6(b)(1).
126. See id. The attorney may only reveal information to prevent the client from committing a
criminal act that is likely to result in "imminent death or substantial bodily harm .. " Id.
127. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1) (1983) with MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (3) (1980). See infra notes 140-46 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the other differences between the relevant Model Rules and Model Code
provisions.
128. See generally ABA, AMENDMENTS TO PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
WITH SYNOPSIS 13 to 19-16 (Feb. 7-9, 1983).
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proposed a rule that permitted disclosure "to prevent the client
from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer
reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm or in substantial injury to the financial interests or property
of another. ' 129 The House of Delegates rejected this language in
favor of a proposal by the American College of Trial Lawyers to
limit the exception to criminal acts resulting in death or substantial
bodily harm. 13 0
The purpose of the College's amendment was simply to limit
the exception and thereby strengthen the duty of confidentiality.' 3 '
Adoption of the amendment was especially noteworthy in light of
the widely publicized O.P.M. case. 132 In that case lawyers for
O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc. of New York City assisted O.P.M.
in securing loans by drafting opinion letters based on documents
supplied by O.P.M. that the lawyers apparently did not know to be
fraudulent. 133 When O.P.M.'s fraud became apparent, the lawyers
chose to remain silent while their client defrauded additional
lenders.1 34 O.P.M. fraudulently obtained loans totaling more than
$210 million. 35  While the lawyers' conduct in maintaining
confidential information appears to be consistent with the
provisions of the Model Code, there is little doubt their choice is
mandated by Rule 1.6.136 Since the Rule's limited exception
129. Id. at 13. See supra note 95 for the full text of the Commission's Proposed Rule 1.6.
130. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983). See supra note 95 for a
discussion of the action of the House on the amendment proposed by the American College of Trial
Lawyers.
131. ABA, AMENDMENTS TO PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH SYNOPSIS
(S) 19-1 (Feb. 7-9, 1983). The American College of Trial Lawyers stated its purpose as follows:
The College believes that Proposed Rule 1.6 seriously undermines the attorney's
duty to preserve a client's confidences. A client's confidence should only be revealed
when disclosure will prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes will cause imminent death or serious bodily harm. The College accepts the
view that such consequences are so serious as to tip the scales in favor of permitting,
but not requiring, the attorney to disclose confidential information.
Id.
132. See Taylor, Ethics and the Law: A Case History, N. Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1983 (Magazine), at 3 1;
Taylor, Lawyer Confidentiality v. Disclosing Crimes-to-Be, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1983, section A, at 9,
col. 1. Because disciplinary proceedings were never brought against the attorney in the O.P.M. case,
there is no reported decision. The facts of the affair are drawn from the New York Times Magazine
coverage.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., the Reporter for the Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards, specifically mentioned the O.P.M. affair at the outset of the House of Delegates debate
on Rule 1.6.
133. Taylor, Ethics and the Law. A Case History, N.Y. Times,Jan. 9, 1983 (Magazine), at 33. The
lawyers representingO.P.M. belonged to the law firm of Singer Hutner. Id.
134. Id. at 46. Singer Hutner decided that they needed outside legal advice. Id. at 33. The firm
contacted Joseph McLaughlin who in turn contacted a legal ethics expert, Henry Putzel, 1II. Id.
Putzel advised Singer Humer that they had no duty to withdraw the false opinion letters and
documents the firm had unwittingly provided to the bank to obtain loans for O.P.M. Id. at 46.
Putzel reasoned that "leaving the victims of a past fraud in the dark was not an ongoing fraud." Id.
135. Id. at 31.
136. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(l)(b) (1983) (lawyer may only
284
CLIENT CONFIDENCES
probably does not contemplate the bodily harm that results when a
defrauded banker jumps from an office window, the lawyer has no
option under the Model Rules but to maintain the confidential
information.
This conclusion is reinforced by the deletion of the
Commission's proposal that would have permitted a lawyer to
disclose confidential information to rectify the consequences of a
client's fraud or crime that was furthered by the use of the lawyer's
services.137 This language would have allowed the lawyers for
O.P.M. to disclose the fraud since the fraudulently obtained
opinion letters were used in O.P.M.'s massive fraud. 13 8 Materials
released by the ABA since adoption of the Rules suggest that the
College's amendments have resulted in an exception which "is
substantially narrower than the agency principles from which it was
derived because of the lawyer's countervailing need to maintain a
candid and open relationship with his clients." 13 9
Rule 1.6 also appears to modify the belief standards required
of a lawyer who relies on the "future crime" exception. The
lawyer's belief is relevant on two separate points, the first related to
the necessity of revelation and the second to the likelihood that
serious physical harm will result from the client's act.
The introductory phrase for the exceptions to Rule 1.6
provides that "the lawyer may reveal such information to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary.'" 4 0  This
maintains the Model Code's principle that only information which
is necessary to prevent the crime is to be revealed. ' 4'
Before the lawyer determines what information needs to be
disclosed, the lawyer must decide that the client's conduct is
improper. Under the Model Code, this decision turns on whether
the client intends to commit a crime; the Model Rules focus instead
on the specific harmful consequences of the client's act.
reveal confidential information to prevent death or substantial bodily harm).-But see id. Rule 1.2(d).
Rule 1.2 provides that "a lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent .... " Id. The comment to Rule 1.6 notes the
existence of Rule 1.2(d). See id. Rule 1.6 comment, Disclosure Adverse to Client. The duty of
confidentiality should prevail over the duty of obligation in Rule 1.2(d) since there is a presumption
that Rule 1.6 is riot superseded by other conflicting provisions. See id. Rule 1.6 comment Disclosures
Otherwise Required or Authorized. The comment to Rule 1.6, however, also describes Rule 3.3 (a)( 4 ),
the duty not to offer false evidence, as "a special instance of the duty prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) ....
Id. Rule 1.6 comment Disclosure Adverse to Client. Since Rule 3.3 explicitly supersedes Rule 1.6, it may
be argued that Rule 1.2(d) should implicitly do so.
137. See ABA, AMENDMENTS TO PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH
SYNOPSIS 13 (Feb. 7-9, 1983) (Proposed Rule 1.6_b) (2)).
138. SeeTaylor, Ethics and the Law: A Case Hitory, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1983 (Magazine), at 46,
139. LEGAL BACKGROUND TO THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 72 (1983)
(Tentative Draft, January 1984).
140. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1983).
141. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1980). See supra note
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The language of the exception in the Model Rules limits its
application to "a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to
result" in the specified severe consequences. 14 2 The comment to
Rule 1.6 suggests the impracticality of basing the exception on the
lawyer's knowledge that certain consequences will occur rather
than on belief. 14 3 The Commission's proposed exception would
have required the lawyer to "reasonably" believe that the harmful
consequences of the criminal act were likely to result.14" The word
"reasonably" was deleted in the College's amendment. 145
Deletion of this objective benchmark apparently expands the
lawyer's discretion to reveal when the likelihood of harm is difficult
to determine. The absence of any reference in the Model Rules to
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" belief standard of an ABA ethics
opinion predating the Model Code 146 appears to have the same
effect.
One proposed amendment to Rule 1.6 would have required
disclosure of serious future crimes. 47 Two ABA entities that often
reflect the thinking of criminal defense lawyers, the Section of
Criminal Justice and the Standing Committee on Legal Aid and
Indigent Defendants, offered this amendment," 8 but it was reject-
ed by the House of Delegates.14 9 The amendment would have
required disclosure of "information to the extent the lawyer
believes necessary to prevent death or substantial bodily harm to
15 tor the text of DR 4-101(C)(3) and supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Model Codeprovision.
142. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1983).
143. Id. comment Disclosures Adverse to Client. This comment to Rule 1.6 states, "It is very
difficult for a lawyer to 'know' when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the client
may have a change of mind." Id.
144. ABA, AMENDMENTS TO PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH SYNOPSIS
13 (Feb. 7-9, 1983) (Proposed Rule 1.6(b)(1)). See supra note 95 for the text of Proposed Rule
1.6(b)(I).
145. Id. at (S) 19-2. The Model Rules define the words "knows," "believes," "reasonably,"
and "reasonably believes."
" 'Knows' denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be
inferred from circumstances." Terminology, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT at 7 (1983).
This suggests an objective standard ofscienter.
" 'Believes' denotes that the person involved actually supposed the fact in question to be true. A
person's belief maybe inferred from circumstances." Id. This is more subjective than "knows."
" 'Reasonably,' when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer, denotes the conduct of a
reasonably prudent and competent lawyer." Id. This adverb establishes an objective standard of
measurement for whatever it modifies.
" 'Reasonably believes,' when used in reference to a lawyer, denotes that the lawyer believes
the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable." Id. This
definition attempts to combine both subjective and objective elements.
146. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965) (lawyer not required to
disclose adverse information unless the facts in the attorney's possession "indicate beyond a
reasonable doubt that a crime will be committed"). See supra notes 82.-85 and accompanying text for
a discussion of this opinion and the "beyond a reasonable doubt" beliefstandard.
147. See ABA, AMENDMENTS TO PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH
SYNOPSIS 19-8 (Feb. 7-9, 1983).
148. id.
149. ABA House of Delegates, DailyJournal (Feb. 7-9, 1983).
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any person. ' 150 Rule 1.6, as approved, maintains the practice of
the Model Code of permitting, rather than requiring, disclosure. 151
Once an exception removes the professional obligation to maintain
confidential information, other law or the lawyer's personal mores
may mandate disclosure.
4. Disclosure to Collect Fee or in Self-Defense
Rule 1.6 maintains the exception that permits disclosure of
confidential information in certain disputes between the lawyer and
client. 152 In place of the Model Code's reference to establishing or
collecting a fee, 153 Rule 1.6 permits disclosure "to establish a claim
or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the
lawyer and the client.' '154 The more general language of Rule 1.6
would permit the lawyer to disclose confidential information, for
example, to recover property from the client as well as to collect a
fee. 155
This exception to Rule 1.6 is narrowed, as compared to the
language of the Model Code, in two respects. First, the lawyer may
disclose confidential information to defend a criminal charge or
civil claim only if the charge or claim is "based upon conduct in
which the client was involved." ' 15 6 Second, by virtue of the
introductory phrase to the exceptions in Rule 1.6, the lawyer may
disclose only that information which the lawyer "reasonably
believes necessary" to establish the claim or defense. 157 The Model
Code does not include this limitation in the language of its
exception, 158  but a long-standing ABA interpretation would
similarly limit the Model Code provision. 15 9
150. ABA, AMENDMENTS TO PROPOSED MODEl RULES OF PROFESSIONAl CONDUCT WITH SYNOPSIS
19-8 (Feb. 7-9, 1983).
151. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (1980) (provides that a
lawyer "may" reveal).
152. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1983>. See supra note 90 for
the text of Rule 1.6(b)(2).
An amendment offered by the District of Columbia Bar would have added "upon appropriate
notice of the client" at the beginning of the exception. ABA, AMENDMENTS TO PROPOSED MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH SYNOPSIS 19-10 (1983). The House of Delegates rejected this
notice requirement. ABA House of Delegates, DailyJournal (Feb. 7-9, 1983).
153. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1980). See supra note
15 for the text of DR 4-101(C).
154. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2).
155. Code Comparison, id. Rule 1.6.
156. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1980) (lawyer
may reveal confidences or secrets necessary to defend against an accusation of wrongful conduct) with
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1983) (lawyer may reveal information to
establish a defense to a criminal or civil charge against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the
client was involved).
157. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1983).
158. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (1980). See supra note 15
for the text of Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (C).
159. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 19 (1930) (revealed
confidences must be "relevant and material" to the proceedings).
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B. DUTY OF CANDOR TO THE TRIBUNAL - RULE 3.3
While Rule 1.6 generally strengthens the duty of
confidentiality, the duty gives way under Rule 3.3 to the integrity
of the judicial system. 160 In place of the confusing, circular
provisions of the Model Code that have the effect of preferring
confidentiality, 161 the Model Rules substitute a clear duty to reveal
client confidences to avoid a fraud upon the court
Rule 3.3 sets forth the lawyer's duty of candor to the court.
The specific prohibitions in Rule 3.3(a) do not differ greatly from
the provisions of the Model Code. The lawyer is prohibited from
"knowingly" making a "false statement of material fact or law to a
tribunal"' 62 and from "offer[ing] evidence that the lawyer knows
to be false.' ' 63 Rule 3.3 also requires the lawyer "to disclose a
material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client.' 164 This
requirement is not explicit in the Model Code but arguably may be
implied from it. 165
These requirements, in themselves, do not represent major
changes from the Model Code. The key difference between the
Model Code and the Model Rules is that the candor requirements
of the Model Rules "apply even if compliance requires disclosure
of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.',166 Because of the
privileged communications exception to the Code's requirement co
rectify frauds upon the court,167 the Code permits a lawyer to
maintain confidential information even if the client commits
perjury. 168 That result and the unsuccessful compromise contained
160. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983). See supra note 91 for the text of
Rule 3.3.
161. See supra notes 32-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems relating to
confidentiality and candor to the court under the Model Code.
162. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (a) (1) (1983). Accord MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5)(1980). Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(5) provides that
"a lawyer shall not... knowingly make a false statement of law or fact." Id.
163. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1983). See also MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4), (6) (1980). Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(4)
provides that a lawyer "shall not... knowingly use perjured testimony or false evideice'.'" Id. DR
7-102(A)(4). Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(6) provides that a lawyer "shall not... participate in the
creation or preservation of evidence when he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false."' Id.
DR 7-102(A)(6).
164. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (a) (2) (1983).
165. See Code Comparison, id. Rule 3.3. The Code Comparison for Rule 3.3 provides that "[this
provision] is implicit in DR 7-102(A)(3), which provides that 'a lawyer shall not... knowingly fail to
disclose that which he is required by law to reveal.' " Id. Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(3), however, is
so ambiguous that it may be inappropriate to imply this provision from it.
166. Id. Rule 3.3(b)-
167. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1980).
168. See supra notes 36-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of DR 7-102(B)(1).
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in Standard 4-7.7 of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 169 are
rejected in favor of the interests of the court. 170
If the client has committed perjury or in some other fashion
the lawyer has offered "material evidence" that the lawyer later
"comes to know" is false, Rule 3.3 requires the lawyer to take
"reasonable remedial measures. 171 According to the comment to
Rule 3.3, the lawyer should attempt to remedy the introduction of
perjured testimony or false evidence by a three-step process.172
First, the lawyer is to "remonstrate with the client
confidentially." 173 Second, if remonstration fails, the lawyer should
seek to withdraw "if that will remedy the situation. ' 174 If
withdrawal is ineffectual or impossible, the lawyer is required to
take the third and final step of disclosure to the court. 175 The
language of the comment recognizes the limitations on the remedy
of withdrawal. 176 Since the Model Code opts for confidentiality
over candor to the tribunal, withdrawal appears to be the preferred
method of resolving the conflict under the Code. Because of the
preference in the Model Rules for candor to the court, withdrawal
is unlikely to be a sufficient response following a client's perjury.
The final version of Rule 3.3 was the product of extensive
debate by the ABA House of Delegates. The House considered
seven amendments, rejecting six and adopting only one minor
amendment. 177 Aside from this one minor change, Rule 3.3 as
adopted by the House of Delegates is identical to the proposal of the
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards.
The American College of Trial Lawyers, which had succeeded
169. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 4-7.7 (2d ed. 1980) (Tentative Draft
approved Feb. 12, 1979, with the exception of Standard 4-7.7). See supra notes 42-49 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Standard 4-7.7.
170. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment Remedial Measures (1983).
171. Id. Rule 3.3 (a) (4).




176. Id. The comment states that "[a]n unscrupulous client might in this way attempt to
produce a series of mistrials and thus escape prosecution. However, a second such encounter could
be construed as a deliberate abuse of the right to counsel and as such a waiver of the right to further
representation." Id. See supra note 49 for discussion of a North Carolina case suggesting the
approach endorsed by this comment.
177. ABA House of Delegates, Daily Journal (Feb. 7-9, 1983). The one amendment the House
of Delegates adopted related to ex parte proceedings and was offered by the ABA Section of Patent,
Trademark and Copyright Law and the American Patent Law Association. See ABA, AMENDMENTS
To PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH SYNOPSIS (S) 70-17 (Feb. 7-9, 1983).
The House adopted the amendment by voice vote. An amended provision is Rule 3.3(d) of the
Model Rules. See supra note 91 for the text of Rule 3.3(d). The amendment offered by the New York
State Bar Association would have deleted the provision on ex parte proceedings entirely: Id. at LS)
70-2. The House rejected the New York amenument by voice vote. See infra note. -181-83, 187and
accompanying text for additional discussion of the New York amendment.
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in narrowing the exception to Rule 1.6,178 attempted to delete the
language that makes Rule 3.3 superior to Rule 1.6 in case of a
conflict between the two. 179 In addition, the College's amendment
would have added language to accomplish precisely the opposite
result.1 8 0  The House of Delegates also debated three other
amendments to accomplish the same end.1 8 ' The House rejected all
four amendments, three by voice vote and the last by a vote of 209
to 101.182
Two of the four rejected amendments would have deleted the
requirement to disclose information to avoid assisting a client's
criminal or fraudulent act. 183 Two of these amendments would also
have included language to recognize that constitutional law might
One of the rejected amendments would have deleted Rule 3.3(a)(3), which requires a lawyer to
reveal to the tribunal legal authority that is controlling but directly adverse to the client. See id. at (S)
70-19 (offered by Iowa State Bar Association). This obligation, which relates to candor to the court
but not directly to confidentiality, is contained in Disciplinary Rule 7-106(BXI) of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(B)(1)
(1980). See infra notes 181-84, 188-89 and accompanying text for additional discussion of the Iowa
amendment.
178. See supra notes 129-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the American College of
Trial Lawyers amendment to Rule 1.6.
179. See ABA, AMENDMENTS TO PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH
SYNOPSIS (S) 70-9 (Feb. 7-9, 1983). The College's amendment would have deleted the provision that
the duties established by Rule 3.3 "apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6."
180. Id. The College's amendment would have added the following pertinent provisions:
(c) If the lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the
lawyer shall disclose this fact to the tribunal unless such disclosure is prohibited by
Rule 1.6.
(d) If the lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity,
and disclosure of this fact is prohibited by Rule 1.6, the lawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to convince the client to consent to disclose. If the client refuses to consent to
disclosure, the lawyer may seek to withdraw from the representation in accordance
with Rule 1.16.
Id.
181. These amendments were proposed by the New York State Bar Association, the
International Association of Insurance Counsel, and the Iowa State Bar Association. See id. at (S) 70-
2 (New York State Bar Association amendment); (S) 70-3.1 (International Association of Insurance
Counsel amendment); (S) 70-19 to 70-20 (Iowa State Bar Association amendment). The three
amendments differed in precise language from each other and from the amendment offered by the
American College of Trial Lawyers, but all four unsuccessfully attempted to reverse the preference of
Rule 3.3 over Rule 1.6.
182. ABA House of Delegates, Daily Journal (Feb. 7-9, 1983). The Iowa State Bar Association
amendment was the last of the four debated and the only one on which there was a recorded vote; the
other three were rejected by voice vote. The author, who personally observed the House of Delegates
deliberations on the Model Rules, believes the margin of defeat in the voice vote on the earlier
amendment offered by the American College of Trial Lawyers was closer than the 2-to-I margin on
the Iowa amendment. The will of the House was clear from the three voice votes rejecting the
preference for Rule 1.6, so the standing vote on the Iowa amendment probably includes some
bandwagon effect.
183. These were the amendments offered by the New York State Bar Association and by the
Iowa State Bar Association. See ABA, AMENDMENTS TO PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT WITH SYNOPSIS kS) 70-2 (New York State Bar Association amendment); (S) 70-19 (Iowa
State Bar Association amendment) (1983). An amendment offered by the International Association
of Insurance Counsel would have expanded this exception to cover "otherwise intentionally
tortious" acts as well as criminal and fraudulent conduct but would have made the entire exception
subordinate to Rule 1.6. See id. at (S) 70.3.1.
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supersede the requirements of Rule 3.3 in criminal cases;1 4
although the House of Delegates rejected these amendments,
language to this effect is included in the comment to Rule 3.3.185
The House also rejected an amendment that would have
incorporated Standard 4-7.7 of the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice into Rule 3.3.186
Several of the rejected amendments dealt with the issue of false
evidence. Two amendments would have deleted the provision
permitting a lawyer to disclose evidence that the lawyer reasonably
believes is false. 1 8 7 A third would have permitted withdrawal if the
lawyer believes the evidence is false. 188 Two amendments addressed
the situation in which the lawyer learns that evidence is false after it
is offered; these amendments would have required the lawyer to
disclose if permitted by Rule 1.6.189 If disclosure were prohibited,
184. The amendment offered by the American College of Trial Lawyers would have added the
following language: "Caveat: Constitutional law defining the right to assistance of counsel in
criminal cases may supersede the obligations stated in this rule." Id. at (S) 70-9.1. The amendment
of the Iowa State Bar Association would have added the following: "Notwithstanding paragraphs (a)
through (e), a lawyer does not violate the rules of professional conduct if that lawyer acts in
accordance with the requirements of applicable law defining the right to assistance of counsel in
criminal cases." Id. at (S) 70-20.
185. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment Constitutional Requirements
(1983). The comment provides:
The general rule - that an advocate must disclose the existence of perjury with
respect to a material fact, even that of a client - applies to defense counsel in criminal
cases, as well as in other instances. However, the definition of the lawyer's ethical duty
in such a situation may be qualified by constitutional provisions for due process and
the right to counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions these provisions have been
construed to require that counsel present an accused as a witness if the accused wishes
to testify, even if counsel knows the testimony will be false. The obligation of the
advocate under these Rules is subordinate to such a constititutional requirement.
Id.
186. ABA House of Delegates, Daily Journal (Feb. 7-9, 1983). The Section of Criminal Justice
and the Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants proposed the amendment that
would have added the following provision:
(e) Notwithstanding subsections (a) through (d), a lawyer for a defendant in a
criminal case shall not disclose that the client has perpetrated a fraud or testified
falsely. However, if the lawyer knows that the client will testify falsely, the lawyer
shall:
(1) Counsel the client against such testimony; and
(2) Not assist the client in preparing such testimony; and
(3) Not assist the client in testifying except to the extent necessary to avoid
revealing to the fact finder the lawyer's knowledge that the testimony is false; and
(4) Not refer to such testimony in the lawyer's argument to the fact finder unless
the circumstances of the case require such a reference in order to avoid revealing to the
fact finder the lawyer's knowledge that the testimony is false.
ABA, AMENDMENTS TO PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH SYNOPSIS 70-11
(Feb. 7-9, 1983). The House rejected the amendment by voice vote.
187. The New York State Bar Association and the State Bar of Michigan offered the
amendments, which would have deleted Rule 3.3(c) of the Model Rules, as adopted. See ABA,
AMENDMENTS TO PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH SYNOPSIS (S) 70-2 (New
York State Bar Association amendment); 70-10 (State Bar of Michigan amendment) (Feb. 7-9,
1983). The House rejected both amendments by voice vote.
188. The Iowa State Bar Association offered this amendment. Id. at (S) 70-19 to 70-20.
189. '1he American College of Trial Lawyers and the Iowa State Bar Association otered the
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the lawyer could withdraw but only after encouraging the client to
consent to disclosure. 190
In light of the influence wielded by the American College of
Trial Lawyers in the consideration of Rule 1.6,191 the result of the
debate on Rule 3.3 was somewhat surprising. The end product is
an enigma: a stronger duty of confidentiality that gives way totally
when it conflicts with candor to the court.
The preference for candor to the court over client
confidentiality is likely to have significant practical effects. When
the client lies to the court, the lawyer's first duty is to the court. The
client who is unaware of the lawyer's preeminent duty, who reveals
confidential information to the lawyer, and who then seeks to lie
suffers unexpected but arguably just consequences. If the client is
aware of the Model Rules' preference, the lawyer will be the
ultimate loser, since the client will not disclose information that
may be crucial to effective representation.
C. DISCLOSURE OF FRAUD ON THIRD PERSON - RULE 4.1
Rule 4.1 of the Model Rules maintains the preference of the
Model Code for confidentiality over disclosure of a client's fraud on
a third person. 192 Unlike the Model Code, this preference is the
product of clear language. Although the result is the same as under
the Model Code, the Model Rules achieve the result without the
circular reasoning and interpretive gap-filling that is necessary
under the Code. 193
IV. CONCLUSION
With one major exception, the Model Rules strengthen the
amendments. See id. at (S) 70-9 (American College of Trial Lawyers amendment); (S) 70-19 (Iowa
State Bar Association amendment).
190. Id.
191. See supra notes 129-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the influence of the
American College of Trial Lawyers on Rule 1.6.
192. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (1983). See supra note 92 for the text
of Rule 4.1.
The confidentiality exception in Rule 4.1 resulted from an amendment offered by the American
College of Trial Lawyers. ABA House of Delegates, Daily Journal (Feb. 7-9, 1983); ABA,
AMENDMENTS TO PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH SYNOPtSIS (S) 89-2.1
(Feb. 7-9, 1983). After lengthy debate the House adopted the amendment by a vote of 188 to 127.
The confidentiality exception applies only to Rule 4. l(b), which prohibits a lawyer from knowingly
failing to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act by a client. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4. 1(b) (1983).
The exception does not apply to the prohibition against knowingly making a false statement of
material fact. Id. Rule 4.1 (a).
193. See supra notes 32-76 and accompanying text tor a discussion of a lawyer's duties under the
Model Code when the client perpetrates a fraud upon another individual.
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duty of confidentiality. Broadening the scope of information
covered, narrowing the future crime exception, and adding
provisions that state the priority of confidentiality over other
specific provisions are all significant changes in favor of greater
confidentiality. Making confidentiality subordinate to candor to
the court, however, substantially weakens the fundamental
principle of confidentiality.
The duty of confidentiality may be further eroded as
individual states consider adoption of the Model Rules.
Particularly when the client uses the lawyer's services to further a
crime or fraud 94 or where substantial property or financial
interests may be harmed, 195 the duty of confidentiality may be
forced to give way. When death or serious bodily harm may result,
some states may require the lawyer to disclose confidential
information. 196
While some states may choose to weaken the duty of
confidentiality, others may strengthen it. As the Model Rules
emerged from the ABA House of Delegates, there was only one
substantial weakness. That weakness - the preference for candor
to the court over confidentiality - was the result of a hard-fought
battle. That battle will continue in the various states. It is unlikely
that the interests of the court will prevail in every jurisdiction.
194. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which issued an order stating its intention to adopt the
Model Rules following a comment period, approved a modification to reinsert the provision
permitting disclosure to rectify the consequences of a crime or fraud in which the lawyer's services
were used. II Current ReportsI LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAl CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 17 (Jan.
25, 1984). The Michigan State Bar has recommended adoption of the Model Rules but with this
provision reinserted. Id. at 71 (Feb. 22, 1984).
195. The Michigan State Bar also favors permitting disclosure if substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another is likely. Id.
196. A New Jersey Supreme Court committee and the New Jersey State Bar Association have
recommended adoption of the Model Rules with the addition of this required disclosure. Id. at 17
(Jan. 25, 1984).
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